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REACHING BA TSON'S CHALLENGE TWENTY-FIVE YEARS
LATER: ELIMINATING THE PEREMPTORY CHALLENGE
AND LOOSENING THE CHALLENGE FOR CAUSE
STANDARD
MATT HAVEN*
1. INTRODUCTION: RACE MATTERS
Race matters. Gender matters. Age matters. These immutable
traits shape the lens through which we view the world, and they shape
the lens through which the world views us. Take the response to
Hurricane Katrina as an example. More than six out of ten black
Americans "believe that the slow response to the hurricane was
because the vast majority of victims were poor and African
American."2 Conversely, nine out of ten white Americans "believe
neither race nor poverty were factors in the government's response." 3
Because these traits matter, and because they are readily
apparent to the naked eye, attorneys have the ability to manipulate the
makeup of a jury in a discriminatory manner to best serve their
clients.4 Thus, the courts' role in ensuring the fairness of the jury
selection process, for the jurors, parties, and the system's legitimacy, is
critically important to achieving the "constitutional guaranties of 'an
impartial jury' and fair trial."5 Yet, as we reach the twenty-fifth
anniversary of Batson v. Kentucky, 6 the Supreme Court's first major
attempt to combat discriminatory jury selection practice, current
jurisprudence shows that our justice system still is not even close to
living up to its Constitutionally mandated ideals.7
A jury's purpose under the Sixth Amendment is to "act as the
conscience of the community." Juries, at their essence, are meant to
Copyright 0 2011 by Matt Haven.
*Juris Doctor Candidate 2012, University of Maryland School of Law.
1. See infra text accompanying notes 2-3 and 146-53.
2. Meera Adya et al., Cultural Diferences in Perceptions of the Government and the
Legal System: Hurricane Katrina Highlights What Has Been There All Along, 8 J.L. & Soc.
CHALLENGES 27, 32 (2006).
3. Id.
4. See infra text accompanying notes 156-62.
5. Frazier v. United States, 335 U.S. 497, 505 n. 11 (1948).
6. 476 U.S. 79 (1986).
7. See infra Part VI.
8. Stephanie Domitrovich, Jury Source Lists and the Community's Need to Achieve
Racial Balance on the Jury, 33 DuQ. L. REV. 39, 40 (1994).
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be "composed of the peers or equals of the person whose rights it is
selected or summoned to determine; that is, of his neighbors, fellows,
associates, persons having the same legal status in society as that
which he holds." 9  If the jury does not accurately represent the
community, the jury's function, to fashion appropriate remedies within
the community, is lost. Accurate community representation on the jury
"depends upon both the selection of the venire panel and the selection
of prospective jurors from that panel."10 This article focuses solely on
the selection of the jury, and on the discriminatory use of peremptory
challenges. 11
While peremptor challenges "occup[y] an important position
in our trial procedures,"] they have been used "to discriminate against
black jurors,"' 3 which in turn harms black defendants, potential jurors,
and the judicial system's integrity and perceived legitimacy.14
Although the judiciary has taken several steps to include black and
minority jurors and eradicate this bias,15 the Court has not done
enough to combat the racially discriminatory use of peremptory
challenges. Part II of this article discusses the purpose and use of
peremptory challenges, and illustrates how the Supreme Court did
nothing to truly combat discriminatory jury selection practices until
Batson. Part III of this article analyzes Batson, discussing the major
shift away from previous case law, which left the use of peremptory
challenges virtually undisturbed. Part IV of this article analyzes
Batson's current application, illustrating its current three step test. Part
V of this. article argues that Batson has fallen short of its
constitutionally mandated goal to end racially discriminatory jury
selection practices. It also argues that Batson is inherently flawed
because it places too much trust in the litigant's proffered race-neutral
9. Strauder v. West Virginia, 100 U.S. 303, 308 (1880), abrogated by Taylor v.
Louisiana, 419 U.S. 522 (1975).
10. Sheri Lynn Johnson, The Language and Culture (Not to Say Race) of Peremptory
Challenges, 35 WM. & MARY L. REv. 21, 23 (1993)
11. Peremptory challenges are typically defined as challenges that are "exercised
without a reason stated, without inquiry and without being subject to the court's control."
Swain v. Alabama, 380 U.S. 202, 220 (1965) (citing Lewis v. United States, 146 U.S. 370, 378
(1892)), overruled by Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79 (1986).
12. Batson, 476 U.S. at 98.
13. Id. at 99.
14. See id. at 88 (citing Strauder, 100 U.S. at 308) (stating that such practices are an
"impediment to securing to [black citizens] that equal justice which the law aims to secure to
all others."). This reasoning would also apply to harming women or any other cognizable
minority, as recent cases have expanded Batson's reach in acknowledgement of this point. See,
e.g., J.E.B. v. Alabama ex rel. T.B., 511 U.S. 127, 128-29 (1994).
15. See infra Parts III, IV.
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reasons for their strikes, and because courts are ill-equipped to truly
curb the discriminatory use of peremptory challenges. Part VI argues
that, as many scholars and judges have argued in the past, the only
way to truly reach Batson 's promise is to eliminate peremptory
challenges and slightly loosen the standards on challenges for cause.
II. PEREMPTORY CHALLENGES: PURPOSE, USE, AND PRE-BATSON
JUDICIAL ACQUIESCENCE TO THE OPENLY RACIST USE OF THE
PEREMPTORY CHALLENGE
While the Constitution does not confer a right to peremptory
challenges,16 they "traditionally have been viewed as one means of
assuring the selection of a qualified and unbiased jury."l 7 Although
Congress "has never legislatively defined what a peremptory challenge
is in the federal system,"' 8 peremptory challenges are typically defined
as challenges that are "exercised without a reason stated, without
inquiry and without being subject to the court's control."' 9 In contrast,
a challenge for cause is a "request from a party to a judge that a certain
prospective juror not be allowed to be a member of the jury because of
specified causes or reasons." 20
The supposed purpose of peremptory challenges is to "reassure
litigants ... of the fairness of the jury that will decide their case.,,21 Put
another way, peremptory challenges are supposed to be used to
"eliminate extremes of partiality on both sides," and to "assure the
parties that the jurors before whom they try the case will decide on the
basis of the evidence placed before them, and not otherwise." 22
Litigants believe that challenges for cause are insufficient to assure
fairness at trial because "hints of bias not sufficient to warrant
challenge for cause" may arise, and litigants believe that being able to
23dismiss these jurors assures obtaining a fair and impartial jury.
Peremptory challenges are often used "upon the sudden impressions
16. Stilson v. United States, 250 U.S. 583, 586 (1919).
17. Batson, 476 U.S. at 91 (citing Swain v. Alabama, 380 U.S. 202, 219 (1965)).
18. United States v. Leslie, 783 F.2d 541, 574 (5th Cir. 1986) (Williams, J., dissenting),
vacated, 479 U.S. 1074 (1987).
19. Swain, 380 U.S. at 220 (citing Lewis v. United States, 146 U.S. 370, 378 (1892)).
States have generally defined peremptory challenges as "an objection to a juror for which no
reason need be given, but upon which the court shall exclude him." Hawkins v. United States,
116 F. 569, 572 (9th Cir. 1902) (emphasis added).
20. Poet v. Traverse City Osteopathic Hosp., 445 N. W.2d 115, 118-19 (Mich. 1989).
21. United States v. Annigoni, 96 F.3d 1132, 1137 (9th Cir. 1996).
22. Swain, 380 U.S. at 219.
23. See McDonough Power Equip., Inc. v. Greenwood, 464 U.S. 548, 554 (1984).
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and unaccountable prejudices we are apt to conceive upon the bare
looks and gestures of another, upon a juror's habits and associations,
or upon the feeling that the bare questioning [of a juror's] indifference
may sometimes provoke a resentment." Yet, rather than using
peremptory challenges to exclude biased venirepersons,25 peremptory
challenges have been used to create racially imbalanced and biased
juries.
Scholars who are familiar with American legal, social, and
political history likely will not be surprised that litigants use legal tools
to discriminate against African Americans and minorities.26 Prior to
Batson, the Supreme Court allowed litigants in a criminal trial to use
peremptory challenges in a racially discriminatory manner by
deferring to their discretion, and by refusing to scrutinize their use of
peremptory challenges. 2 7
Starting in 1880, in Strauder v. West Virginia,28 the Court
began to slowly recognize and disallow discriminatory selection
practices, at least ostensibly, in the jury selection process. In Strauder,
an African American man was indicted, convicted, and sentenced for
murder.29 The defendant was convicted and sentenced by an all white
jury, because West Virginia law at that time allowed only "white male
persons who are twenty-one 3rears of age and who are citizens of this
State . . . to serve as jurors."3 The Court held that this statute violated
the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, stating that
this discrimination in selection of jurors "amounts to a denial of the
equal protection of the laws to a colored man when he is put upon trial
for an alleged offence against the State."31
While this was an important case because it moved the Court in
the proper direction to some extent, the Court severely limited this
holding. First, the Court stated that its holding did not mean to prohibit
a state from prescribing "the qualifications of its jurors."32 The Court
24. Swain, 380 U.S. at 220 (internal citations and quotation marks omitted).
25. A venireperson is a prospective juror. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1695 (9th ed.
2009). An individual is a "venireperson" after arriving at court for jury duty, but before he or
she is selected to serve on a specific jury. See id.
26. See, e.g., Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S. 393 (1857), superseded by constitutional
amendment, U.S. CONST. amend. XIV.
27. See Swain, 380 U.S. at 221-22 (stating that "[t]o subject the prosecutor's challenge
in any particular case to the demands and traditional standards of the Equal Protection Clause
would entail a radical change in the nature and operation of the challenge.").
28. 100 U.S. 303 (1880), abrogated by Taylor v. Louisiana, 419 U.S. 522 (1975).
29. Id. at 304.
30. Id. at 305.
31. Id. at 310.
32. Id.
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then noted that states may make distinctions based on, among other
things, land ownership or educational qualifications. 33 States used this
mandate in their "black codes," essentially negating any advance in
allowing African Americans to serve on juries.
More importantly, the Court noted that the issue was "not
whether a colored man, when an indictment has been proffered against
him, has a right to a grand or a petit jury composed in whole or in part
of persons of his own race or color."34 Criminal defendants only had
the right to a jury in which "all persons of his race or color" are not
excluded by law "solely because of their race or color. . . so that by no
possibility can any colored man sit upon the jury." 35 Essentially, the
Court states that a criminal defendant does not have the right to have
persons of his race or color on the jury; the only right the Court
guarantees is that the law will not prohibit persons of a criminal
defendant's race or color from serving on his jury. 36 This holding did
not add many, if any, African Americans to juries in this country.3
The Court continued to acquiesce to racially discriminatory
jury selection practices in its 1965 decision in Swain v. Alabama. 38In
Swain, the defendant, a black man, was convicted of rape, and
sentenced to death.39 In selecting the jury, the prosecution
peremptorily struck all six prospective African Americans .40 The
Court stated that "we cannot hold that the striking of Negroes in a
particular case is a denial of equal protection of the laws." 41 The Court
reasoned that it could not subject a prosecutor's challenges in every
case to "the demands and traditional standards of the Equal Protection
Clause [because doing so] would entail a radical change."42
Continuing its deferential theme, the Court also stated that "[t]he
33. Id.
34. Id. at 305.
35. Id.
36. See Swain v. Alabama, 380 U.S. 202, 203-04 (1965) (stating "[a]lthough a Negro
defendant is not entitled to a jury containing members of his race, a State's purposeful or
deliberate denial to Negroes on account of race of participation as jurors in the administration
of justice violates the Equal Protection Clause."), overruled by Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S.
79 (1986).
37. See Kim Taylor-Thompson, Empty Votes in Jury Deliberations, 113 HARv. L. REV.
1261, 1262 (2000) (stating that even since Batson, which followed Swain and took further
steps to eliminate racial discrimination in jury selection, "the complexion and composition of
juries have barely changed[, and] [j]uries remain overwhelmingly white and male.").
38. 380 U.S. 202 (1965).
39. Id. at 203.
40. See id. at 210.
41. Id. at 221.
42. Id. at 222.
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presumption in any particular case must be that the prosecutor is using
the State's challenges to obtain a fair and impartial jury."43
The Court stubbornly took this deferential stance despite a
strong showing that it should hold otherwise. The defense argued that
every available black juror who survived challenges for cause was
excluded in this case. 44 Further, the Court even acknowledged that
there had not been an African American on a jury in that county since
1950; a fifteen-year period without one black juror, in a county that is
twenty-six percent African American.4 5  Unlike Strauder, African
Americans in Swain were not prohibited by law from serving on juries,
but the effect was the same. Again, over a span of fifteen years, in a
county where African Americans comprised twenty-six percent of the
population, not one African American was selected to serve on a
46 thjury. Yet, the Court still held that the defendant failed to demonstrate
that the prosecutor used peremptory challenges in a systematically
discriminatory manner, reasoning that the record before it "does not
with any acceptable degree of clarity, show when, how often, and
under what circumstances th[is] prosecutor alone has been responsible
for striking those Negroes who have appeared on petit jury panels in
Talladega County."47 This argument is easily countered by the fact that
zero black jurors had been selected in this county for fifteen years.48
Therefore, it necessarily follows that if this prosecutor had ever tried a
case in Talladega County in the previous fifteen years, he had not ever
allowed a black juror to sit on one of his cases.
In the twenty years that followed, Swain was "extensively
criticized by commentators." 49 Yet, following Swain's holding, many
lower courts adhered to the rule that defendants must prove
"systematic exclusion" to establish each Tarticular prosecutor's
discriminatory use of peremptory challenges. This burden of proof
was nearly insurmountable, as "defendants in state and federal courts
[were] overwhelmingly unable to establish a prima facie case of
43. Id.
44. Id. at 210.
45. Id. at 226.
46. Id.
47. Id. at 224. The Court is referring to the fact that the defendant did not show that this
specific prosecutor had a history of striking black jurors. Id. The only way the Court would
find an improper use of peremptory strikes is if the defendant could prove that the prosecutor
"systematically excluded" black jurors. See infra note 52.
48. Id. at 226.
49. United States v. Childress, 715 F.2d 1313, 1316 (8th Cir. 1983).
50. Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 82 n.l (1986).
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systematic exclusion." 5' In 1983, almost twenty years after Swain, the
Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit stated that its research
indicated "that a defendant has successfully established systematic
exclusion in only two cases since Swain was decided in 1965."52 Two
years later, the Supreme Court would shift away from this standard.
III. BATSON'S SHIFT AWAY FROM SWAIN
In 1986, the Supreme Court in Batson v. Kentucky overturned
the principal holding in Swain that "the Constitution does not
require... an inquiry into the prosecutor's reasons for using his
peremptory challenges to strike blacks from the petit jury panel in the
criminal trial of a black defendant." 54 In Batson, the black male
defendant "was indicted in Kentucky on charges of second-degree
burglary and receipt of stolen goods."55 The prosecutor struck all four
African Americans on the venire using peremptory challenges, and the
jury was "composed only of white persons." 56
Despite the factual similarity to Swain, the Court in Batson
held that the use of "peremptory challenges[] is subject to the
commands of the Equal Protection Clause."5 The Court continued by
noting that in equal protection cases, the burden is "on the defendant
who alleges discriminatory selection of the venire to prove the
existence of purposeful discrimination."5 s Successfully proving
purposeful discrimination is a three-step process; the defendant must
make out a prima facie case of discrimination, the burden then shifts to
the prosecution to provide a race-neutral reason for its strike, and if the
prosecution is successful, the defendant then must show that totality of
circumstances indicates that this strike is discriminatory.59
To meet its burden, a defendant "alleging that members of his
race have been impermissibly excluded from the venire may make out
a prima facie case of purposeful discrimination by showing that the
totality of the relevant facts gives rise to an inference of discriminatory
51. Childress, 715 F.2d at 1316.
52. Id.
53. 476 U.S. 79 (1986).
54. Batson, 476 U.S. at 100 (White, J., concurring).
55. Batson, 476 U.S. at 82 (majority opinion).
56. Id.
57. Id. at 89.
58. Id. at 93.
59. See text accompanying notes 65-81.
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purpose." 60 Further, to successfully make this prima facie case of
purposeful discrimination, the defendant "must show that he is a
member of a racial group capable of being singled out for differential
treatment." 61
The defendant then has two options to successfully complete
his prima facie case. First, the defendant may make his prima facie
case "by proving that in the particular jurisdiction members of his race
have not been summoned for jury service over an extended period of
time... because the 'result bespeaks discrimination."' 62 Second, even
without such evidence, the defendant can still make a prima facie case
by "relying solely on the facts concerning its selection in his case."63
The defendant must show that the facts in his case, along with any
other relevant facts, "raise an inference that the prosecutor used
[peremptory challenges] to exclude the veniremen from the petit jury
on account of their race." 64 The Court noted that the "trial court should
consider all relevant circumstances" to determine if the defendant has
met his burden. 65 Examples of "relevant circumstances" include "a
pattern of strikes against black jurors included in the particular
venire," or "the prosecutor's questions and statements during voir dire
examination." 66 If the defendant successfully makes his/her prima
facie case, "the burden shifts to the State to explain adequately the
racial exclusion."67 Moving away from Swain 's holding, the Batson
Court held that"[t]he State cannot meet this burden on mere general
assertions that its officials did not discriminate or that they properly
60. Id. at 93 94. The court further stated that "[i]n deciding if the defendant has carried
his burden of persuasion, a court must undertake a sensitive inquiry into such circumstantial
and direct evidence of intent as may be available." Id. at 93 (citing Arlington Heights v.
Metro. Hous. Dev. Corp., 429 U.S. 252, 266 (1977)). The Court went even further when it
stated "[wie have observed that under some circumstances proof of discriminatory impact may
for all practical purposes demonstrate unconstitutionality because in various circumstances the
discrimination is very difficult to explain on nonracial grounds." Id. For example, the Court
stated that the "total or seriously disproportionate exclusion of Negroes from jury venires is
itself such an unequal application of the law . . . as to show intentional discrimination." Id
(quoting Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229, 241 (1976)).
61. Id. at 94.
62. Id. (quoting Hemandez v. Texas, 347 U.S. 475, 482 (1954)).
63. Id. at 95. The Court made this extension because it found that "[a] single
invidiously discriminatory governmental act is not immunized by the absence of such
discrimination in the making of other comparable decisions." Id. at 95 (internal citations
omitted). The Court continued to state that "to dictate that 'several must suffer discrimination'
before one could object would be inconsistent with the promise of equal protection to all." Id.
at 96 (quoting McCray v. New York, 461 U.S. 961, 965 (1983) (Marshall, J., dissenting)).
64. Id. at 96.
65. Id.
66. Id. at 97.
67. Id. at 94.
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performed their official duties." 68 Instead, the State must demonstrate
that it used "race neutral selection criteria and procedures," and that
these criteria and procedures, and not race-based criteria, produced the
lack of a certain race on the jury.69 Essentially, if the defendant makes
his prima facie case, the prosecutor must provide a "race-neutral
reason" for excluding the African American venirepersons in
question.70
The Court emphasized "that the prosecutor's [race neutral]
explanation need not rise to the level justifying exercise of a challenge
for cause."71 Thus, while a prosecutor cannot rebut a prima facie case
of discriminatory use by "stating merely that he challenged jurors of
the defendant's race on the assumption-or his intuitive judgment-that
they would be partial to the defendant because of their shared race,"72
the prosecutor may simply rebut defendant's prima facie case by
offering some "race-neutral reason" for the use of a peremptory
challenge.73
Last, if the prosecutor rebuts the defendant's prima facie case,
the Court must weigh both parties' submissions and determine
"whether the defendant has shown purposeful discrimination." 74 In
Batson, the Supreme Court remanded the case because under its
holding, the prosecutor must give a race-neutral explanation for his
strike, and the prosecutor was afforded no opportunity to do so.75
Batson has continued to expand. In Powers v. Ohio, decided
five years after Batson, the Court held that a "criminal defendant may
object to race-based exclusions of jurors effected through peremptory
challenges whether or not the defendant and the excluded jurors share
the same race." 76 The defendant in Powers was a white man who made
a Batson challenge to the prosecution's peremptory striking of a black
juror.77 Therefore, any defendant, regardless of his or her race, can
institute a Batson challenge to a peremptory strike because the Equal
Protection Clause "prohibits a prosecutor from. . . exclud[ing]
68. Id.
69. Id
70. See Snyder v. Louisiana, 552 U.S. 472, 477 (2008) (explaining the three-step test
from Batson).
71. Batson, 476 U.S. at 97.
72. Id.
73. See id. at 98.
74. See Snyder, 552 U.S. at 477.
75. Batson, 476 U.S. at 100.
76. Powers v. Ohio, 499 U.S. 400, 402 (1991).
77. Id. at 402-03.
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otherwise qualified and unbiased persons from the petit jury solely by
reason of their race."78
The Court continued to build upon Batson in Georgia v.
McCullom, 7 9 where the Court held that the prosecution, and not just
the defense, could challenge the racially discriminatory use of
peremptory challenges.80 In McCullom, the prosecution attempted to
ensure that the defense would not be able to strike black jurors on the
basis of race because the victims were African American, and the
defendant was white. 8' The Court held that prosecutors and defendants
alike could make Batson challenges.82
Last, in JE.B. v. Alabama ex rel. TB.,83 the Court extended the
allowable use of Batson challenges to gender, holding that peremptory
challenges exercised solely on the basis of gender, much like
challenges exercised solely on the basis of race, violated the Equal
Protection Clause.84 Thus, the Batson challenge has become an
expansive doctrine. Although it has expanded, and although it took a
"historic step toward eliminating the shameful practice of racial
discrimination in the selection of juries,"85 Batson, as Justice Marshall
forecasted, "did not end the racial discrimination that peremptories
inject into the jury selection process." 86
IV. BA TSON'S PROGENY- SOLIDIFYING THE THREE-STEP BA TSON
CHALLENGE PROCESS
Following Batson, the Supreme Court clarified the three-step
Batson challenge process. The Court clarified Batson 's first inquiry in
Johnson v. California,87  holding that the party making the Batson
challenge meets this first inquiry making out "a prima facie case
[]showing that the totality of the relevant facts gives rise to an
78. Id. at 409.
79. 505 U.S. 42 (1992).
80. Id. at 59.
81. Id. at44-45.
82. Id. at 59.
83. 511 U.S. 127 (1994).
84. Id. at 146. A further extension came in Edmonson v. Leesville Concrete Co., 500
U.S. 614, 631 (1991). There, the Court held that private litigants in a civil case cannot exercise
their peremptory strikes in a racially discriminatory manner. This is also important, and the
same arguments apply to civil trials as do criminal trials.
85. Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 102 (Marshall, J., concurring)
86. Id. at 102-03.
87. 545 U.S. 162 (2005).
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inference of discriminatory purpose."88  In Johnson, California
attempted "to require at step one that the objector must show that it is
more likely than not the other party's peremptory challenges, if
unexplained, were based on impermissible group bias."89 The Court
held that this requirement was impermissible, and held that the party
making a Batson challenge meets their burden of establishing a prima
facie case by simply raising an "inference[] that discrimination may
have occurred." 90
Second, the Court has clarified the second prong of a Batson
challenge, whether the challenged litigant justifies the peremptory
strike based on a race neutral reason, in Purkett v. Elem91 and
Hernandez v. New York,92 stating that this standard "does not demand
an explanation that is persuasive, or even plausible." Rather, the Court
will find that the challenged party's explanation is race neutral
"[u]nless a discriminatory intent is inherent in the prosecutor's
explanation." 93 Further, the Court stated that a neutral explanation
merely means "an explanation based on something other than the race
of the juror."94
To illustrate, in Hernandez, the prosecutor struck two Latino
venirepersons because he felt "very uncertain that they would be able
to listen and follow the interpreter. "95 The prosecutor clarified by
stating that he was concerned that Spanish-speaking jury members
would not accept the interpreter's translation of the Spanish speaking
witness testimony.96 The prosecutor added that these Latino
venirepersons "each looked away from me and said with some
hesitancy that they would try, not that they could, but that they would
try to follow the interpreter."9 7 The Court held that the prosecutor
offered a facially race neutral reason for his peremptory strikes. 98
The Court's third inquiry is whether the litigant using the
peremptory challenges did so in a purposefully discriminatory
88. Id. at 168.
89. Id.
90. Id. at 173.
91. 514 U.S. 765 (1995).
92. 500 U.S. 352 (1991).
93. Purkell, 514 U.S. at 768 (quoting Hernandez, 500 U.S. at 360).
94. Hernandez, 500 U.S. at 360.
95. Id. at 356.
96. See id. at 356-57.
97. Id. at 356.
98. Id. at 361.
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manner.99 Currently, most of the Court's ultimate decisions to uphold
or deny a Batson challenge are determined in this third step, because
"[i]t is not until the third step that the persuasiveness of the
justification [for the peremptory challenge] becomes relevant." 00 This
third step can be highly subjective and heavily dependent on the trial
court's rulings.
To illustrate this third step, in Hernandez, the Supreme Court
held that the prosecutor's facially race neutral reasons for exercising
peremptory strikes on these two Latino venirepersons did not amount
to purposeful discrimination. 101 The Court made this finding even
though the prosecutor's reasons for his challenges were based on the
challenged venireperson's ability to speak Spanish, which is highly
correlated with being Latino. 10 2 The Court stated that trial courts are to
be afforded great deference in these types of appeals, 103 Mostly
because the "best evidence [for determining whether counsel's facially
neutral reason should be believed] often will be the demeanor of the
attorney who exercises the challenge," which can best be ruled upon
by the trial judge. 104 The Court also stated that "where there are two
permissible views of the evidence, the fact-finder's choice between
them cannot be clearly erroneous."105
The Court set the outer limit of permissibility in this third
prong in Miller-El v. Dretke,106 where the Supreme Court held that the
prosecutor's use of peremptory challenges was purposefully
discriminatory. 0 7 In Miller-El, there were twenty available black
venirepersons, nine were excused for cause, the prosecutor
peremptorily struck ten, and only one served on the jury. 108 Put
another way, the prosecution struck ninety-one percent of the eligible
99. Johnson v. California 545 U.S. 162, 171 (2005); see also Hernandez, 500 U.S. at
359-60.
100. Johnson, 545 U.S. at 171 (quoting Purkett, 514 U.S. at 768).
101. Hernandez, 500 U.S. at 369. The prosecutor's challenges "rested neither on the
intention to exclude Latino or bilingual jurors, nor on stereotypical assumptions about Latinos
or bilinguals." Id. at 361. The prosecutor divided jurors into two classes; those who might
have difficulty in accepting the translator's rendition of Spanish-language testimony and those
indicated no difficulty. Id. The Court acknowledged that this criteria might "result in the
disproportionate removal of prospective Latino jurors," but that this did not equal a "per se
violation of the Equal Protection Clause." Id.
102. See id. at 361.
103. Id. at 364.
104. Id. at 364-65.
105. Id at 369.
106. 545 U.S. 231 (2005).
107. Id at 237.
108. Id. at 240-4 1.
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African American venire members.109 At the same time, the prosecutor
only struck twelve percent of non-black jurors.' 10 The Court stated that
"[h]appenstance is unlikely to produce this disparity."'
Moreover, the Court found dubious similarities between black
venire members who were struck, and white venire members who the
prosecution did not strike. The Court used these similarities as
"evidence tending to prove purposeful discrimination."ll 2  For
example, the prosecutor struck a black venire member who actually
strongly supported the death penalty, mischaracterizing the venire
member's sentiments as only supporting the death penalty if the
defendant could not be rehabilitated.' 13 In stark contrast, the
prosecutor did not strike a white venire member who "believed in the
death penalty if a criminal cannot be rehabilitated and continues to
commit the same type of crime," and who doubted that a convicted
murderer could commit a crime in the future.11 4 The prosecutor did not
strike, and did not question, several other jury members who showed a
similar leaning towards rehabilitation, tending to show purposeful
discrimination." 5
The Court found many more inconsistencies in the prosecutor's
treatment of venirepersons based on race.116 The prosecutor used the
state's jury shuffle procedure in an attempt to bring the non-black
venire members to the front of the line, and send the black venire
members to the back, where "they were likely to avoid voir dire
altogether."ll 7 The Court found that use of this procedure "raise[d] a
suspicion that the State sought to exclude African-Americans from the
jury."" 8 The Court also found evidence of the prosecutor seeking to
exclude black venire members in the "contrasting voir dire questions
posed respectively to black and nonblack panel members, on two
different subjects." 1 19 The Court believed that the prosecutor used
109. Id at 241.
110. Id. at 266.
111. Id.at241.
112. Id.
113. Id at 242. After the defense pointed out the mischaracterization, the prosecutor
changed his reason for the strike, stating that he struck the venire person because his brother
was convicted of a crime. The Court refused to credit this reason, as it "reek[ed] of
afterthought." Id. at 246.
114. Id. at 244.
115. Id at 244-45.
116. See id. at 247-52.
117. Id. at 253-54.
118. Id. at 254.
119. Id. at 255.
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different lines of questioning to make it seem as though black venire
members were biased, and use this as ammunition to "make a case for
excluding black panel members." 20 Lastly, the Court noted that in the
"decades leading up to the time this case was tried, prosecutors in the
Dallas County office had followed a specific policy of systematically
excluding blacks from juries."l 2 1 Again, the Court found this to be
evidence of a likely racially discriminatory motive for excluding a
disproportionately high number of black venire members.122 For all of
the above reasons, the Court held that the prosecutor had unlawfully
used peremptory challenges to strike venire members on the basis of
race.123
Litigants today are unlikely to act in an egregiously
discriminatory manner as the prosecutor in Miller-El did, making the
Supreme Court's decision in Snyder v. Louisianal24 highly important.
In Snyder, the Court again refined the third prong of the Batson
inquiry by discussing the common use of strikes invoking a juror's
demeanor, including nervousness and inattention. 125 The Court stated
that in cases where a litigant strikes a venire member by invoking their
demeanor, "the trial court must evaluate not only whether the
[litigant's] demeanor belies a discriminatory intent, but also whether
the juror's demeanor can credibly be said to have exhibited the basis
for the strike attributed to the juror by the prosecutor." 26
In Snyder, the prosecutor struck an African-American venire
member, Mr. Brooks, because "he looked very nervous to me
throughout the questioning," because he was a student-teacher who
may want to go home quickly, and because he was therefore
supposedly more likely "to come back with guilty of a lesser verdict so
there wouldn't be a penalty phase." 2 7 Importantly, the trial judge
simply stated that he was going to allow the strike, and did not make a
specific determination regarding the credibility of the attorney and the
reasons for his strike.128 Therefore, the Court found that there was no
evidence that the "trial judge credited the prosecutor's assertion that
120. Id. at 260.
121. Id at 263.
122. Id. at 266.
123. See id
124. Snyder v. Louisiana, 552 U.S. 472 (2008).
125. Id. at 477.
126. Id.
127. Id. at 478.
128. Id. at 479.
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[juror] was nervous," meaning the typically high deference to the trial
judge did not attach.129
The Court held that the prosecutor's second reason for the
strike, Brooks' teaching obligation, "fails even under the highly
deferential standard of review."' 30 Brooks was one of more than fifty
venire members who "expressed concern that jury service or
sequestration would interfere with work, school, family, or other
obligations."31 Yet, Brooks contacted the dean of his school, who said
that Brooks would be able to make up time missed, the prosecutor
knew of this fact, and Brooks made no further complaints about
-132
serving on the jury.
The Court also found several problems with the prosecutor's
third reason for the strike-that Brooks would want to leave quickly
and therefore was more likely to come back with a lesser verdict.' 33
First, the Court found this reasoning to be highly speculative, because
even if Brooks wanted a quicker solution, it may have been quicker for
Brooks to come back with a first-degree murder verdict if a majority of
the other jurors favored this finding.' 34 More importantly, the
prosecutor anticipated a short trial "on the record during voir dire-
mean[ing] that serving on the jury would not have seriously interfered
with Mr. Brooks' ability to complete his required student teaching." 35
At the same time, the prosecutor did not strike a venire member whose
obligations were "substantially more pressing than Mr. Brooks'," and
the prosecutor attempted "elicit assurances that he would be able to
serve despite his work and family obligations."' 36 As such, the Court
held that the prosecutor failed to satisfy the third prong of the Batson
inquiry. 1 3 7Miller-El and Snyder show that courts must make a serious
and searching inquiry into the actual reasons for either party's use of
peremptory challenges. Yet, as discussed below, Batson and its
129. Id.
130. Id. at 480.
131. Id
132. See id. at 480-81.
133. Id. at 478.
134. Id. at 482.
135. Id.
136. Id. at 483-84. The more pressing obligations were explained as,"[m]y wife just had
a hysterectomy, so I'm running the kids back and forth to school, and we're not originally from
here, so I have no family in the area, so between the two things, it's kind of bad timing for
me." Id. at 484.
137. See id. at 486.
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progeny have still failed to prevent racially motivated peremptory
challenges.138
V. BATSON AND ITS PROGENY'S FLAWS
Batson was a large and historic step towards eliminating racial
discrimination in the selection of juries, so it may be unfair, to a
certain extent, to criticize Batson for not going far enough. Yet, Batson
and its progeny remain inherently flawed because the Court trusts
litigants too much, and it simply does not possess the tools necessary
to determine if a litigant's strikes are legitimate. Therefore, Batson has
done little to remedy the problem it intended to fixl 40 -to properly
ensure that defendants receive their "right to be tried by a jur 4 whose
members are selected pursuant to non-discriminatory criteria."
First, Batson and its progeny are inherently flawed because the
Court still places too much trust in the litigant's proffered reasons for
their peremptory challenges. Notably, in Batson, the Court stated that
it had "no reason to believe that prosecutors will not fulfill their duty
to exercise their challenges only for legitimate purposes." 42 Reality
contradicts this sentiment. As Justice White pointed out in Batson, "the
practice of peremptorily eliminating blacks from petit juries in cases
with black defendants remains widespread." 4 3 In fact, prosecutors
openly explained to the courts that they "routinely strike black
jurors," 44 and at least one prosecutor's office had an instruction book
that "explicitly advised prosecutors that they conduct ury selection so
as to eliminate any member of a minority group."l4 No real change
138. See infra Part V.
139. Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 102 (1986) (Marshall, J., concurring).
140. Edward S. Adams & Christian J. Lane, Constructing a Jury that is Both Impartial
and Representative: Utilizing Cumulative Voting in Jury Selection, 73 N.Y.U. L. REV. 703,
706 (1998).
141. Batson, 476 U.S. at 85-86.
142. Id at 99 n. 22.
143. Id. at 101 (White, J., concurring); see also id at 103 (Marshall, J., concurring)
(discussing several racially discriminatory practices in several areas in the mid-1970s, in
which prosecutors, for example, peremptorily challenged eighty-one percent of black jurors,
eighty-two percent of black jurors in a different locale, or used 68.9% of their peremptory
challenges on black venire members who made up less than twenty-five percent of the
venire).
144. Id. at 103-04 (Marshall, J., concurring).
145. Id. at 104 (discussing Dallas County, Texas, where in 100 felony trials from 1983-
1984, prosecutors peremptorily struck 405 out of 467 eligible black jurors).
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has been achieved since 1986, as Batson has failed to effectively end
the discriminatory use of peremptory challenges.14 6
Litigants continue to use peremptory challenges in a
discriminatory manner, either consciously or unconsciously, likely
because race matters in this country. Today, black Americans "live in
a society in which racism is a part of their everyday reality." 47 Shaped
by their many centuries of struggles in this country, black Americans
have acquired a cohesive and distinct identity.14 Put another way,
"[r]ace is still a major shaper of African American lives." 49 "Black
group identity includes a particular sensitivity to issues of racism and
oppression,"' 5 0 and the lens through which black Americans view the
world is inherently different than the lens through which white
Americans look. Black Americans are more likely to understand the
culture of other black Americans, are more likely to see the world as
other black Americans do, and are less likely to judge other black
Americans on character traits that are uniquely black. 5 1
In the legal context, black Americans view the police and the
judicial system with "deep cynicism" and mistrust. 152 According to
studies, black Americans are more likely than white Americans to
"perceive racial disparities in policing, with African Americans feeling
as though they are the targets of the police." 53 Due to these different
views regarding the police and the judicial system, "persons of
different races often evaluate evidence by different criteria."'l 54 With
this in mind, if a prosecutor is attempting to convict a defendant in a
jury trial, and his main witnesses are police officers, the prosecutor has
every reason to try to strike as many black venire members as
146. Kenneth J. Melilli, Batson in Practice: What We Have Learned About Batson and
Peremptory Challenges, 71 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 447, 503 (1996).
147. Shani M. King, Race, Identity, and Professional Responsibility: Why Legal Services
Organizations Need African American Staff Attorneys, 18 CORNELL J. L. & PUB. POL'Y 1, 12
(2008).
148. See id. at 12-13.
149. Id. at 14 (citation omitted).
150. Id. at 16.
151. Id. King discusses why black clients would prefer black lawyers, because they are
less likely to be stereotypically judged, but the same reasoning applies to the context of this
paper.
152. See David A. Harris, The Stories, the Statistics, and the Law: Why "Driving While
Black " Matters, 84 MINN. L. REV. 265, 298 (1999).
153. Adya et al., supra note 2, at 35 (analyzing the CNN/USA Today/Gallop Race
Relations Survey and the NBC News/The Wall Street Journal Survey in 1998).
154. Adams & Lane, supra note 140, at 710 (noting that "[i]t is less than clear whether
the racial, ethnic, gender, or other demographics of a jury actually effect a change in
verdicts.").
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possible.' When a prosecutor knows that he can statistically improve
his chances of having a jury with more favorable jurors, he is likely to
jump at this chance. 56 The same can be said for the defense, who is
more likely to strike white jurors in a case where police testimony is
used because white jurors statistically, are likely to view police
testimony more favorably.157
Put simply, litigants' use "of race as a factor in selecting juries
is irrefutable."' 8 Litigants receive limited information from jurors, so
when they are "[f]aced with making exclusionary decisions on the
basis of limited information, attorneys naturally rely on group
stereotypes, assisted by personal experience, lawyering tradition, and
an extensive body of instructional material." 59 This is not to
necessarily blame litigants, or to even assign a racially discriminatory
or hateful label to these litigants.160 But, as former Dallas County
assistant district attorney McMahon advised in a training video, it is
the prosecutor's job to win convictions, and any prosecutor who does
not "aggressively try to get a ... jury that's favorable to [his or her]
side ... [is] a fool."'61 In this video, McMahon advocates striking
black venire persons, and later stated that it "'may appear ... racist or
what not,' but that 'the other side's doing the same thing.""
62
Unfortunately, McMahon is correct. The legal community in
general recognizes that "reliance on stereotypes is a common-though
not necessarily desired-practice."' 63 Acting rationally upon these
155. Id. at 748 (stating that "[a]s with the prisoners' dilemma, using peremptory
challenges to discriminate gives the striking party an edge in seating a preferred jury.").
Because black Americans are less likely to trust police officers, they are logically less likely to
trust a police officer's testimony than white Americans, who do not the same troubled history
with law enforcement.
156. See id at 748-49. It is important to note that I am not stating that black jurors in a
case with a black defendant would be unfairly biased, and the same holds true with white
jurors. Yet, in certain scenarios, black or white jurors are likely to view cases or certain types
of witnesses more or less favorably. Favorable jurors and impartial jurors are completely
separate ideas.
157. See id.
158. Id. at 705. This is not to say that it is the only factor, it is simply the most
contentious. Id. at 705 n. 7.
159. Id. at 707.
160. Ethically and legally, litigants are blameworthy for purposefully using strikes based
on race against the letter and spirit of Batson. Lawyers are not merely instruments for their
clients to win a case, they also owe duties to the courts and to the profession in general.
However, one cannot discount the pressure put on litigants to win, regardless of the morality
of their use of peremptory challenges.
161. Adams & Lane, supra note 140, at 708.
162. See id (internal citations omitted).
163. Id.
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stereotypes, "[t]he discriminating litigant improves his or her chances
of seating a jury 'favorable' to her case regardless of the approach
taken by the opposition."l 64 Thus, even though litigants must be more
careful with their challenges after Miller-El and Snyder, they will still
discriminate in the jury selection process and attempt to cloak their
strikes based on some race neutral reason.
In addition to placing too much trust in litigants who still use
race to strike jurors, the second, and more troubling, problem with
Batson and its progeny is the fact that courts are incompetent, through
no fault of their own, to discover the litigant's true reason for their
strikes.165 Cases in which litigants use demeanor-based challenges
highlight the court's inadequacy and inability to determine the motive
behind a litigant's strikes. Peremptory challenges, by their nature,
allow litigants to strike venire members if they do not like their tone,
attitude, inattentiveness, or the way in which the venireperson looks at
the litigant and responds to questioning. To illustrate, in United States
v. Ellison,166 the prosecutor struck a black venireperson because she
''seemed disinterested because she had rolled her eyes and sighed
during voir dire examination." 67 Although this juror answered the
questions she had been asked, the prosecutor "didn't think that she
could be a fair and impartial juror."16 1 While the Eighth Circuit noted
that "a prosecutor's subjective judgment about attentiveness may be
particularly susceptible to the kinds of abuse prohibited by Batson,"l69
the appellate court still credited the prosecutor's peremptory challenge
as being non-discriminatory, even though the lower court made no
specific finding as to the individual's behavior.170 With this statement,
the court recognizes that there may be some hint of a racially
motivated challenge, but also recognizes that it has no way to enter the
litigant's mind to determine if their challenge was legitimate.
Although Miller-El and Snyder requires courts to compare the
attorney's treatment of venire members who were not struck to those
who were struck, the court, nor anyone else for that matter, is simply
ill equipped to handle non-egregious demeanor-based challenges. As
the Court noted in Hernandez, the "best evidence [for determining
whether counsel's facially neutral reason should be believed] often
164. Id. at 749.
165. Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 106 (1986) (Marshall, J., concurring).
166. 616 F.3d 829 (8th Cir. 2010).
167. Id. at 832.
168. Id.
169. Id. (internal citations omitted).
170. Id.
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will be the demeanor of the attorney who exercises the challenge."' 7'
Therefore, according to Hernandez, the trial judge must watch the
attorney closely, and determine if the litigant's demeanor is suggestive
of an improper motive. Not only is this a seemingly impossible and
entirely subjective standard, but it places trial judges in the
uncomfortable position of having to rule on an attorney's demeanor
with no clear guidelines.
To further illustrate, if a litigant claims to strike a venire
member because "the juror had a son about the same age as defendant,
or seemed uncommunicative, or never cracked a smile," or that the
venire member's tone and demeanor suggest prejudice, the court will
have an extremely difficult time upholding a Batson challenge on such
a subjective strike.172 Do we really want the judge to say, "Counsel,
based on your demeanor, I can see your intent is to strike these
individuals because of their race?" If we have peremptory challenges,
do we really want judges telling litigants that their gut instincts are
wrong and racially biased? Since the nature of peremptory challenges
is to allow litigants to act based on their "gut feelings," replacing the
litigants' gut feelings with the judge's gut feelings undermines the
entire purpose of peremptory challenges.
Moreover, it is highly likely that litigants will use their strikes
because they actually do get a bad vibe from a juror, but this too could
have an unconscious basis in race. For example, in the United States,
"[b]lack people's style of walking, glances, dress, and haircuts, has
historically engendered fear in those who find it foreign, unfamiliar, or
uncivilized."' As Justice Marshall correctly noted, a litigant's "own
conscious or unconscious racism may lead him easily to the conclusion
that a prospective black juror is sullen, or distant, a characterization
that would not have come to his mind if a white juror had acted
identically." 74
People also gravitate towards those similar to them;17 so, even
the most racially-sensitive white Americans are less likely than black
Americans to be completely familiar and comfortable with black
171. 500 U.S. 352,364-65 (1991).
172. Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 106 (1986) (Marshall, J., concurring) (internal
citations omitted).
173. King, supra note 147, at 17 (internal citations omitted).
174. Batson, 476 U.S. at 106 (Marshall, J., concurring) (internal citations omitted).
175. Brian J. Serr & Mark Maney, Criminal Law: Racism, Premptory Challenges, And
The Democratic Jury: The Jurisprudence of a Delicate Balance, 79 J. CRIM. L. &
CRIMINOLOGY 1, 8 (1988).
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Americans. 176  Furthermore, "[a] judge's own conscious or
unconscious racism may lead him to accept such an explanation as
well supported." 77 Therefore, even if litigants have no ulterior motive
to strike black jurors, they are likely to be less comfortable with a
black juror than a white juror. This makes them more likely to strike
black jurors, citing race-neutral reasons, and judges are more likely to
see nothing wrong with these strikes. Judges are ill-equipped to handle
these problems because unconscious bias is almost undetectable, and
conscious bias is too easy to hide.178
Moreover, there is an inherent difficulty with Batson 's
requirement that a litigant have an "acceptable" race neutral reason for
a peremptory strike. Ifa venire member cannot be struck for cause,
there are usually no truly persuasive reasons for a juror's removal.179
By nature, peremptory challenges are used "upon the sudden
impressions and unaccountable prejudices we are apt to conceive upon
the bare looks and gestures of another, [or] upon a juror's habits and
associations."' 80 As the dissenting justices in Batson and several
commentators correctly note, prior to Batson, the Supreme Court saw a
peremptory challenge as an "arbitrary and capricious right, [which]
must be exercised with full freedom, or it fails of its full purpose."
In other words, the purpose of peremptory challenges is to allow
litigants to strike individuals on arbitrary grounds without a truly
"legitimate" reason. By not allowing litigants to exercise peremptory
challenges with full freedom, Batson seemingly attempts to have the
best of both worlds-keeping peremptory challenges and limiting
discrimination simultaneously-when only one is possible. 82
176. See King, supra note 147, at 17. The article discusses how black attorneys would be
better able to work with black clients and less likely to judge them. Black attorneys will be
less likely to judge their black clients who possess traits and styles that white attorneys would
not understand as well.
177. Batson, 476 U.S. at 106 (Marshall, J., concurring).
178. Brian W. Stoltz, Note, Rethinking the Peremptory Challenge: Letting Lawyers
Enforce the Principles of Batson, 85 TEx. L. REv. 1031, 1041 (2007). Noting that critics of
Batson's current system believe that "all but the most incompetent attorneys can think of some
racially neutral explanation for their actions." Id.
179. Melilli, supra note 146, at 483 n.105. This is, of course, assuming that challenges
for cause are expanded.
180. Swain v. Alabama, 380 U.S. 202, 220 (1965). (internal citations and quotation
marks omitted).
181. Stoltz, supra note 178, at 1031 (citing Swain v. Alabama, 380 U.S. 202, 219
(1965)).
182. See Batson, 476 U.S. at 102-03 (Marshall, J., concurring). History has shown that
"Batson and its progeny have not only stopped short of destroying peremptory challenges but
have been so ineffective that they have rarely stopped peremptory challenges based only on
unambiguously unconstitutional criteria such as race or gender." Daniel M. Hinkle,
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Since racial differences and lawyers' tendencies are not likely
to change, a more fundamental change is required, or else the "jur7
selection system will remain effectively the same as before Batson.
If the system remains the same, the integrity of the American court
system's decisions will continue to be undermined, as minorities
continue to be blocked from juries disproportionately and white
Americans become more aware of this problem. 184
VI. REACHING BA TsoN'S CHALLENGE: ELIMINATING PEREMPTORY
CHALLENGES AND EXPANDING "FOR CAUSE" CHALLENGES
Despite Batson's effort to curb discrimination, its dual-goals of
keeping peremptory challenges and assuring litigants of the "right to
be tried by a jury whose members are selected pursuant to
nondiscriminatory criteria" cannot truly coexist. Completely
eliminating the peremptory challenge, and slightly loosening of the
"for-cause" challenge standard, is the only way to realize Batson 's,
and the Constitution's, promise.185
To that end, first, although many litigators see peremptory
challenges as essential to a jury trial, the fact remains that the use of
the peremptory challenge is not a Constitutional right; it is purely
statutory.186 On the other hand, the right to have a jury selected
pursuant to non-discriminatory criteria is a constitutional right.187
Accordingly, in deciding "between the right [] to have a jury chosen in
conformity with the requirements of the Fourteenth Amendment and
the [statutory] right to challenge peremptorily, the Constitution
Peremptory Challenges Based on Religious Affiliation: Are They Constitutional?, 9 BUFF.
CRIM. L. REV. 139, 199 (2005)
183. Adams & Lane, supra note 140, at 707.
184. Id. at 709. Our court system's legitimacy will be undermined because black
Americans will continue to see themselves shut out of jury service, and white Americans are
becoming aware of the justice system's inequities. See Harris, supra note 152, at 299. A
system that does not have legitimacy cannot last as it is.
185. Jonathan B. Mintz, Note, Batson v. Kentucky: A Half Step in the Right Direction
(Racial Discrimination and Peremptory Challenges Under the Heavier Confines of Equal
Protection), 72 CORNELL L. REv. 1026, 1026 (1987). Mintz notes that peremptory challenge to
potential jurors is "probably the single most significant means by which ... prejudice and bias
[are] injected into the jury selection system." Id. Batson itself recognized this fact, stating that
"there can be no dispute [sic] that peremptory challenges constitute a jury selection practice
that permits those to discriminate who are of a mind to discriminate." Batson, 476 U.S. at 96
(internal citations omitted). This is not to say all litigants discriminate, but those who want to
win at any cost seem likely to.
186. See Mintz, supra note 185, at 1041.
187. Batson, 476 U.S. at 85-86.
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compels a choice of the former." 88 Therefore, "the system, not the
Constitution, must be changed." 89
There can be no middle ground; it is impossible to allow
litigants to use peremptory challenges and ensure that jury members
are selected pursuant to non-discriminatory criteria simultaneously. 90
Total elimination of peremptory challenges is necessary because racial
differences will continue to exist, and lawyers, either consciously or
unconsciously, will continue to exercise peremptory challenges in a
discriminatory fashion because doing so increases their chance of
winning. 191 Although Miller-El and Snyder have made it more difficult
for litigants to get away with blatant discriminatory practices, all but
the least astute trial lawyers will always be able to stay one step ahead
of the Court in finding ways to strike venire members in a way that
will increase their chances of winning.192 Thus, a total elimination of
peremptory strikes is necessary to protect individuals' Constitutional
right to a fair jury trial.
Admittedly, eliminating the peremptory challenge and
loosening the "for cause" challenge would be a significant change, and
although this idea has been popular amongst academics for years, it
has not made significant headway amongst judges.' 93 Further, critics
of this plan often argue that without peremptory challenges, litigants
cannot be assured a fair and impartial jury.194 Similarly, critics also
argue that venirepersons often have hidden biases, so without
188. Mintz, supra note 185, at 1042 (internal citations omitted).
189. Id. Furthermore, "Marbury v. Madison settled beyond a doubt that when a
constitutional claim is opposed by a nonconstitutional one, the former must prevail." Serr &
Maney, supra note 175, at 10.
190. See supra note 192.
191. See supra Part V.
192. See Stolz, supra note 178, at 1041.
193. Stoltz, supra note 178, at 1043 n.95.
194. See Montz & Montz, supra note 188, at 484-85. There is also a concern that this
proposal will increase the length of the voir dire. See Melilli, supra note 146, at 484. While
true, eliminating peremptory challenges will save "time and judicial resources, both in the
exercising of such challenges and in the voir dire that occurs as a means for discovering the
targets of such challenges." Id. Also, Batson litigation is likely to be far less, further reducing
a waste of judicial resources and litigant's time and money. Id. at 485. Further, critics also
argue that this change would create an administrative nightmare. But, purely administrative
concerns regarding changing trial procedures should never trump individual Constitutional
rights. Moreover, as discussed below, this article argues that a committee should be formed to
deal with the transition to these new trial procedures. This committee would eliminate
feasibility concerns.
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peremptory challenges, these biased individuals will be able to serve
on the jury. 95
These arguments are flawed for two reasons. First, these
arguments confuse the litigant's actual right to have a fair and
impartial jury with a litigant's non-existent right to a favorable jury.196
It is true that eliminating peremptory challenges may hamstring
litigants' ability to obtain the most favorable jury for their clients; but,
this does not mean that the jury is not fair and impartial. On the
contrary, it seems likely that juries will be composed of a more
representative sample of the community, which is how juries should be
composed, 197  by disallowing litigants from arbitrarily striking
jurors.1 98 Moreover, a litigant's "expectation that any juror, much less
twelve, will ever be truly without bias borders on fantasy."l 99 People's
life experiences naturally make them biased one way or another, and
there is no possible way for litigants to remove these biases from
members of a jury panel.
Secondly, parties will still have a fair and impartial jury
without peremptory challenges because there is "little evidence that
attorneys' peremptory challenges are reliably related to jurors' verdict
preferences."200 More pointedly, litigants' use of peremptory strikes
often fails to "adequately predict jurors' responses, support[ing] [the
argument for] its abolition." 20 1 If litigants use peremptory challenges
ineffectively, as they do, disallowing their use will not change the
dynamics of the jury.
Further, expanding challenges for cause would largely
eliminate these bias concerns. "Both the critics and the defenders of
the peremptory challenge agree that challenges for cause are
unrealistically narrow, both as defined and as applied."202 For
example, in the current system, a "venireperson's representation that
he or she can lay even the most manifest prejudice aside will generally
195. See Stephen A. Saltzburg & Mary Ellen Powers, Peremptory Challenges and the
Clash Between Impartiality and Group Representation, 41 MD. L. REV. 337, 382 (1982).
196. See Melilli, supra note 146, at 503.
197. See supra text accompanying note 8.
198. By eliminating peremptory challenges, it seems likely that jury members will be
selected more by probability and chance. Therefore, if the system for selecting venirepersons
accurately represents the community, the jury panel will represent the community as well,
because eliminating peremptory challenges eliminates the last possible opportunity for
conscious or unconscious bias to destroy a jury's representative character.
199. Adams & Lane, supra note 140, at 742.
200. Norbert L. Kerr et al., On the Effectiveness of Voir Dire in Criminal Cases with
Prejudicial Pretrial Publicity: An Empirical Study, 40 AM. U.L. REV. 665, 668 (1991).
201. Montz & Montz, supra note 188, at 453.
202. See Melilli, supra note 146, at 486.
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insulate the venireperson from a challenge for cause." 203 Interestingly,
if challenges for cause were expanded, a significant portion of the
peremptory challenges used by litigants in real cases would have
resulted in the jurors being stricken for cause. 204
Specifically, this number, forty-four percent, is taken from
Kenneth Melilli's article, which analyzes the reasons that litigants
gave for using a peremptory challenge in real cases. Under Melliti's
proposed model for expanding challenges for cause, which this article
endorses, forty-four percent of all peremptory challenges used would
have resulted in a juror's removal with an enlarged for cause standard.
205 This leaves roughly fifty-two percent of challenges which were
based on group stereotypes, and almost four percent of challenges
made based on subjective judgments.206 Since the Court began
requiring a more searching analysis of the litigant's rationale in Miller-
El and Snyder cases, decided after Melilli's article, challenges based
on subjective judgments rather than on group stereotypes have likely
increased. But, the fact remains that litigants' proffered reasons for
forty-four percent of their peremptory challenges will be sufficient to
remove jurors under a properly expanded for cause challenge system.
Melilli analyzes each peremptory challenge used, and places them in
the descriptive categories. Courts should generally follow Mellili's
model, expanding challenges for cause to include several of Mellili's
categories, and not including several others. More specifically, a court
should not allow challenges for cause to include gender, prior jury
service, personal appearance (unless egregiously inappropriate for
court), location of home, work or other activities (unless the juror has
not lived in the jurisdiction), family situation (marital and parental
status), economic characteristics, intelligence and education (as long as
the individual is not unable to read in a case where reading would be
important, or unable to understand questions), occupation, and age. 20 7
Similarly, trial courts should remove jurors with extrajudicial
bias or information regarding the case, including familiarity with the
parties, admitted bias, prior information on the case, expressed
predisposition on the credibility of witnesses, expertise in the relevant
field, incapacity (such as physical hardship and extreme inability to
203. Id.
204. Id. at 487.
205. Id. at 497.
206. Id.
207. Id. at 487-97. My views here are consistent with Melilli's, as there is no reason
other than stereotyping to strike jurors with these characteristics, so they should not be
included in challenges for cause.
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see or hear), and personal experience very similar to the subject of the
litigation. Removing such jurors for cause would remedy one of the
biggest problems with the current for cause standard; a juror who
admits having bias but who claims to be, and promises to be impartial,
would not be struck for cause in the current system. 209 In the proposed
system without peremptory strikes, he or she would be.
The more contentious categories include the following: prior
involvement with criminal activity, behavior during voir dire, and
difficulty following instructions.210 First, in regards to prior
involvement with criminal activity, which includes the venireperson's
prior criminal activity, his or her friends or relatives engaging in
criminal activity, and his or her status as a victim of a crime, Melilli
argues that none of these individuals could be excluded for cause on
these bases alone.2 11 I agree because Mellili's model still allows for
removal of jurors whose experiences with crime would make them
biased in the specific case at hand. Such a juror could be removed in
an expanded challenge for cause because Melilli's categories do not
overlap, meaning that the acceptable extension of the for cause
challenges listed above would still be available to litigants.212 To
illustrate, if the "venireperson's relative was a victim of the same
crime which is the subject of the instant prosecution or [] the same
individual prosecutor successfully convicted the venireperson's
relative," this person could not be struck under the "prior crime"
category, but could be removed for cause under the "personal
experience very similar to the subject of the litigation" category.213
Thus, Melilli's model successfully removes venire members who are
truly biased due to personal experiences with law enforcement.
The categories of "behavior during voir dire" and "difficulty
following instructions" could also be contentious because the court
and the parties have an interest in removing clearly inattentive
venirepersons. At the same time, courts must avoid allowing
challenges based on whether the venireperson was timid, assertive,
liberal, or formed an unfavorable impression because these types of
challenges are highly subjective, and have the most potential to hide a
litigant's discriminatory use of strikes. Thus, the court must err on the
side of inclusion, and only strike the most obviously inattentive or
208. Id.
209. Stoltz, supra note 178, at 1046.
210. See Melilli, supra note 146, at 487-97.
211. Id. at487-88.
212. Id. at 487.
213. Id. at 487 n. 122.
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polarizing venirepersons. Either way, the judge ruling on the challenge
for cause must make a record of why he or she did or did not strike the
venireperson. This would allow appeals courts to rule more effectively
on cold appellate records, and would enhance its ability to create
consistent parameters. Further, the Batson challenge will not be
eliminated, though it would surely be used in far fewer cases, because
lawyers should still be able to effectively appeal strikes that they feel
are made on the basis of race.
Admittedly, numerous grey areas likely exist in Melilli's
system. Therefore, if peremptory challenges are removed, and the
proposed system is generally enacted, the courts should create a panel
or advisory committee regarding how to truly implement this system.
Much like committees regarding the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure,
this committee would be composed of experienced prosecutors,
defense attorneys, civil litigants, and judges.
With Melilli's system in place, an advisory committee filling in
the gaps, and Batson challenges available, the discriminatory use of
peremptory challenges will be eliminated and the litigant's right to a
fair and impartial jury will not be destroyed.214 This is what the
Constitution requires. Although the Court has taken positive steps to
eliminate racially motivated strikes, these steps have proven
insufficient, and the only way to guarantee non-discriminatory jury
selection is to completely eliminate peremptory challenges. Under the
current system, racism persists. Individuals are discriminated against
on the basis of gender, class, and age. It is time for the court to rid
itself from this system of discrimination. Eliminate the peremptory
challenge, and allow juries to truly act as the conscious of the
community. Twenty-five years later, Batson's challenge must finally
be met.
214. Another positive step in the right direction, if the true final step is not to be taken as
suggested, comes in Covey's article, arguing that any mixed motive strike, which includes a
valid and non-discriminatory reason for a strike, along with any improper reason, the court
should ignore the valid reason and find that the strike violates Batson. Russell D. Covey, The
Unbearable Lightness ofBatson: Mixed Motives and Discrimination in Jury Selection, 66 MD.
L. REV. 279, 282-83 (2007).
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